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Abstract
The empirical performance of macroeconomic exchange rate models is more than
disappointing.  This dismal result is also reflected in the forecasting capabilities of
professional analysts: all in all, analysts are not in a position to beat naïve random
walk forecasts.  The root for this deficient outcome stems from the fact that
professional forecasts are to a large extend influenced by actual changes in
exchange rates.  A reasonable explanation for this behaviour can be taken from the
behavioural finance literature.  To test whether this characteristic tends to be
general human behaviour in an uncertain environment, we analyse the forecasting
behaviour of students experimentally, using a simulated currency series.  Our
results indicate that a topically oriented trend adjustment behaviour (TOTA) is a
general characteristic of human forecasting behaviour.  Additionally, we apply a
simple model to explain professional and students forecasts.
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A common empirical fact in economics is that standard macroeconomic exchange rate models
fail to explain or even predict actual exchange rate movements accurately.  This dismal result
is also reflected in the poor forecasting performance of professional analysts (see for a
detailed analysis of professional forecasts  Bofinger and Schmidt, [2003a],  Bofinger and
Schmidt, [2003b]).  Thus, analysing the forecasting performance of professional analysts
appears to be tediously at first glance.  However, analysing subjective forecasts of individuals
may reveal interesting characteristics of human decision making in uncertain environments.
As, until now no empirically persuasive exchange rate model exist, exchange rate forecasters
are confronted with an extremely high degree of uncertainty.  Preceding studies have
demonstrated that the forecast errors of professional forecasters all follow a similar pattern
(see Bofinger and Schmidt, [2003a], Bofinger and Schmidt, [2003b] and Spiwoks, [2003]).
Instead of predicting future exchange rate movements, professional forecasts predominantly
reflect the current trend.  Such behaviour can be classified as a topically oriented trend
adjustment behaviour (TOTA) of professional forecasters (see Andres and Spiwoks, [1999]).
A reasonable explanation for this behaviour can be found in the literature of behavioural
finance.  A central element of behavioural finance is the relevance of simple heuristics or rule
of thumbs, which allow quick and often efficient decisions, but sometimes lead to serve
biases.  According to Bofinger and Schmidt, [2003a], Bofinger and Schmidt, [2003b] the poor
forecasting performance of professional forecasters stems from psychological factors which
likely affect human decision making in general (see for e.g. Plous, [1993] and Strack and
Deutsch, [2002]), so we are concerned whether similar results can be reproduced in an
experimental environment.
The experimentally based analysis of expectation formation has a long tradition in economic
research.  When experts lack time, sufficient data or useful models, they predict future values
of a time series judgementally.  Several empirical studies prove that the practice of forecasting
is dominated by judgmental approaches.  Although statistical methods are widely used,
forecasts are not solely based on the output of forecast models, but are adjusted by their users
(see e.g. Dalrymple, [1975], Dalrymple, [1987], Sanders and Manrodt, [1994], Klassen and
Flores, [2001]).  Due to the practical importance of subjective forecasting, human behaviour
has been analysed in numerous experimental studies.  The main characteristic of these
experiments is the experimental procedure:  Subjects have to forecast a time series
judgementally; in most studies the past values of the time series are the only available
information.  A few experimental designs include additional sources of information, e.g. the
output of time series analysis models, in order to observe behaviour in settings closer to
reality.  For a detailed discussion we refer to Webby and O'Connor, [1996], who reviewed the
literature about judgmental and statistical time series forecasting intensively.
Despite the increasing  interest in exploring forecasting behaviour experimentally, there are
comparatively few approaches of modelling human expectation formation.  We apply a very
simple model to the experimentally generated forecasts of students and the empirically
observed forecasts of experts in the sense of the Reuters one-month forecasts.  The model –
the so-called bounds & likelihood heuristics ( b&l heuristics) by Becker and  Leopold-
Wildburger [1996] – has been developed to explain collective one-period point forecasts.
This heuristics has been tested successfully on a large scale and we want to explore, whether
the good results hold for forecasting situations that are closer to reality.2
The remainder of the study is as follows.  In the next section we briefly expose the empirical
failure of economic exchange rate models.  Afterwards the empirical characteristics of
Reuters one-month ahead forecasts are evaluated.  Chapter 4 gives a psychological
explanation for the poor forecasting performance.  Finally, we analyse the forecasting
performance of novices in an experimental setting and test the b&l heuristics.
2  Exchange rate economics: Where do we stand?
The economic approach to exchange rate determination is characterised by the idea that
macroeconomic factors such as the money supply or real income drive exchange rates.  This
view has been manifested through various exchange rate models (see for a comprehensive
illustration of these models Hallwood and MacDonald, [2000]).  However, the explanatory
power of economic exchange rate models appears to be low.  After more than two decades of
intensive empirical testing, the empirical results are summarised by the following two main
conclusions:
§  In the short-run (1-2 years) macroeconomic exchange rate models perform less accurately
than forecasts that do not rely at all on macroeconomic fundamentals.  Even assuming that
market participants can perfectly anticipate the future path of macroeconomic
fundamentals, their forecasts are worse than naïve random walk forecasts.  This result was
originally put forth by Meese and Rogoff, [1983a], Meese and Rogoff, [1983b] who found
that a random walk forecast typically outperforms a forecast based on a macroeconomic
exchange rate model although their forecasts were based on actual realised values of
future explanatory variables.  Until today, this unfruitful awareness is still valid (see e.g.
Chinn and Meese, [1995], Rogoff, [1999], Flood and Rose, [1999] and most recently
Cheung et al., [2003]).  Rogoff, [2001] summarises the present academic consensus
precisely:
“To make a long story short not only have a subsequent twenty years of data and
research failed to overturn the  Meese-Rogoff result, they have cemented it…”
(Rogoff, [2001])
§  In the long-run (3-5 years), however, the recent empirical literature on the validity of
macroeconomic exchange rate models suggests that fundamentally based models have
some explanatory power.  Mark, [1995] shows in his seminal paper that for long horizons
there exist economically significant predictable components in the long-horizon changes
of the log exchange rate.  These systematic exchange rate movements are determined by
economic fundamentals.  Furthermore, the study of  Mark, [1995] reveals that the
explanatory power of fundamental based forecasts measured by the coefficient of
determination (R
2) increases with the forecast horizon and the out-of-sample point
predictions generally outperform the driftless random walk at longer horizons.  Likewise
Chinn and Meese, [1995] and, more recently, Mark and Sul, [2001] confirm the findings
of  Mark, [1995].  Chinn and Meese, [1995] examine the predictive power of structural
exchange rate models using parametric and non-parametric techniques and found that, for
longer horizons, error correction terms can explain exchange rate movements significantly
better than a naïve random walk forecast.  Mark and Sul, [2001] study the long-run
relationship between nominal exchange rates and monetary fundamentals for a panel of 19
countries and find that exchange rates are  cointegrated with long-run determinants
predicted by economic theory and that panel based forecasts have a significant forecasting
power.  However, others remain still sceptical and begin to criticise  Mark, [1995]3
methodology and the resultant conclusions (see Kilian, [1999], Berkowitz and Giorgianni,
[2001], Faust et al., [2003] and Neely and Sarno, [2002]).
To summarise the preceding evidence for fundamental based exchange rate models, we refer
to Kilian and Taylor, [2003] who conclude:
“After nearly two decades of research since Meese and Rogoff’s pioneering work on
exchange rate predictability (…), the goal of exploiting economic models of exchange
rate determination to beat naïve random walk forecasts remains as elusive as ever”
(Kilian and Taylor, [2003], pp. 85)
3  Evaluation of professional exchange rate forecasts
One way to manifest the dismal empirical evidence of economic exchange rate models is to
evaluate the forecasting performance of financial analysts, who are mostly employed by banks
or other financial institutions and should produce best possible forecasts because of their
comparative advantage in the field of exchange rate economics.  As no persuasive exchange
rate model exist, analysts must make their forecasts in situations of high uncertainty and
should therefore perform worse than naïve random walk forecasts.  This study investigates the
characteristics of professional exchange rate forecasts to evaluate their performance and to
explain their failure.
3.1  Description of the available data
Our analysis of professional forecasts is based on survey data provided by Reuters.  Reuters
asks about 50 financial analysts every month for their assessment of the future exchange rate
development.  The period under consideration starts in January of 1999 and ends in March of
2003.  The length of the analysed forecasting horizon corresponds to one month. Figure 1
illustrates the professional forecasts and the corresponding US-$/€ spot exchange rates.  The
spot €/US-$ exchange rate is taken from the IFS CD-ROM of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Here we use the end-of-month values of the preceding month since the market
forecasts are made at the end or the beginning of a month: for instance, the December one-
month forecast for January is typically made at the end of November/beginning of December.












































Reuters 1 month forecast
3.2  Empirical results
3.2.1  Rationality of professional exchange rate forecasts
Following the macroeconomic approach to exchange rate determination, professional
forecasters should form their expectations concerning future exchange rates in a rational
manner.  This suggestion is made clear within the rational expectation hypothesis (Muth,
[1961]).  According to the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), expectations errors (xt+1)
conditioned on the available information set  (Wt) are purely random,
( ) ( )
2
1111 ,      with 0, ttttt SES xxs ++++ =-W : (1)
where S denotes the nominal spot exchange rate and E is the rational expectations operator.
This unbiasedness hypothesis implies that under REH forecasts errors are expected to be zero,
i.e. they fluctuate randomly so that ex post no systematic deviations of the actual spot rate
from the expected rate should be observed.
The unbiasedness hypothesis can be tested by regressing the actual change in the spot
exchange rate on the expected change according to the professional forecasts.  Thus, the null
hypothesis of unbiasedness implies that it is possible to decompose st+h-st as
( ) thttthtth ssEss abe +++ -=+-+ (2)
where s denotes the logarithm of the nominal spot exchange rate, a = 0, b = 1 and et+h has
mean zero and is uncorrelated with  Etst+h-st (see Cavaglia et al., [1994], p. 327).  Table 1
summarises the results of estimating equation (2) via ordinary least square (OLS).  For an
evaluation of the joint null hypothesis of a = 0 and b = 1, we perform a Wald-Test.  The
corresponding F-statistics are also reported in  Table  1.  As the results reveal, the  a
coefficients may be close to zero, but the b coefficients departs significantly from one.  The5
Wald-Test suggests that joint hypothesis of a = 0 and b = 1 cannot be maintained for the one-
month Reuters forecasts.  Thus, the characteristics of professional exchange rate forecasts are
inconsistent with the concept of rational expectations.
Table 1: Rationality of professional forecasts
a a b b F-statistic






Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets.
3.2.2  Accuracy of professional exchange rate forecasts
For an evaluation of the forecasting accuracy of professional analysts we refer to the relative
mean error (ME), the relative mean squared error (MSE) and the relative mean absolute error
(MAE).
1  In addition we use the  Theil’s inequality coefficient to directly compare the
forecasting performance of professional forecasts with naïve random walk forecasts.  Finally,
we also investigate the appropriateness of professional forecasts as direction of change
forecasts (see Moosa, [2000]).
Table 2: Accuracy of professional forecasts
ME MSE MAE Theil’s U Hit rate








Comparative values of random walk forecasts in parenthesis;
Test statistic of the c
2 – Test in brackets
The positive value of the mean error indicates that professional forecasters tend to
overestimate the future development of the Euro against the US-dollar.  In addition, a
comparison of the accuracy of professional forecasts with a naïve random walk forecasts
reveals that for all measures the random walk beats professional forecasts.  This result is also
highlighted by the  Theils’s inequality coefficient, which is above one.  To evaluate the
accuracy of professional forecasts as direction of change forecasts we perform a simple c
2-test
of independence (see Diebold and Lopez, [1996]).  However, the professional forecasts fail to
anticipate the future direction of change; the corresponding hit rate is well below 50 per cent
and the test statistic is insignificant.
Altogether, the results show that the professional forecasts perform worse than a naïve
random walk forecast.  Thus, the results correspond with the results of the forecasting
                                                












































performance of macroeconomic exchange rate models (see  Meese and Rogoff, [1983a],
Meese and Rogoff, [1983b]).
4  A behavioural explanation for the poor forecasting performance of
US-$/€ market forecasts
4.1  Topically oriented trend adjustment behaviour of professional forecasts
The previous results have shown that professional forecasts are flawed predictors of future
exchange rates.  An important cause for this dismal performance of market forecasts is a very
strong impact of current exchange rate developments on professional exchange rate forecasts.
Figure 2 illustrates this finding and shows that professional forecasts move very much in line












































Reuters 1 month forecast (shifted)
Thus, if the current €/US-$ exchange rate depreciates, analysts tend to reduce their forecasts
by about the current depreciation rate.  Andres and Spiwoks, [1999] denote this regularity as a
topically orientated trend adjustment behaviour (TOTA), which has the effect that forecasts
can lose at worst their future-oriented characteristic.  For an evaluation of the TOTA















;  forecastactual R  is the coefficient of determination for the actual exchange rate and the
corresponding market forecasts and 
2
;  forecastactualh R -  is the coefficient of determination for the
forecast and the actual exchange rate at the time of the forecast formation.  Values of the7
TOTA-coefficient smaller than one indicate that forecasts exhibit a higher correlation with the
actual exchange rate at the time of producing the forecast than with the exchange rate for
which the forecast was made.  For the one-month Reuters professional forecasts the
corresponding TOTA-coefficient is 0.8781.  Thus, – on average – professional forecasts have
a stronger relationship with past €/US-$ exchange rates than with the future €/US-$ exchange
rates.  This finding is in line with results of other studies evaluating capital market forecasts.
Bofinger and Schmidt [2003a], [2003b] and Spiwoks [2003] report that market forecasts for
exchange rates, stock indices and government bonds all reveal TOTA-coefficients less than
one.
4.2  Psychological explanations for the topically oriented trend adjustment
behaviour of market forecasts
An important explanation for the topically oriented trend adjustment behaviour of
professional forecasters can be derived from the behavioural finance literature.  Within
behavioural finance, limitations in the acquisition and the processing of information play a
decisive role.  Especially in very difficult decision problems, economic agents try to reduce
the complexity of the world by using simple rules of thumb or “heuristics” which allow quick
and efficient decisions even under high uncertainty (see Fiedler and Bless, [2001], p. 135).
As Gigerenzer and Todd, [1999] have shown there are many heuristics, which provide a good
compromise between economic rationality and an efficient use of scarce human cognitive
resources.  Of course, there are also circumstances where the usage of simple heuristics leads
to systematically biased judgements (see e.g. Kahneman et al., [1999]).
Forecasting exchange rates is a very complex and difficult task. On the one hand, no reliable
macroeconomic models are available to determine relevant fundamental variables and explain
their concrete impact on future exchange rates.  On the other hand, the speculative nature of
the foreign exchange market requires for an individual forecaster to take into account the
forecasts of other market participants confronted with the same problem.  This problem has
already been addressed by Keynes, [1936]. Therefore, it is not astonishing that forecasters
tend to rely on simple heuristics.
A very simple rule of thumb that is important in our context, is the anchoring heuristics.  It
implies that quantitative judgements are often biased towards an initial anchor, which has
come to the mind of the decision maker implicitly or explicitly but is often completely
irrelevant for the decision problem.  An illustrative example for the anchoring effect is
provided by Tversky and Kahneman, [1974].  They asked test persons whether the percentage
of African nations in the United Nations (UN) is higher or lower than an arbitrary number,
which serves as an anchor.  The test persons were divided into two groups; one group was
given a value of 65 % and the other a value of 10 %.  The results showed that the mean
estimates were biased towards the specific anchor. For the “high-anchor group” (65 %) the
mean estimate was 45 %, for the “low-anchor group” (10 %) the mean estimate was 25 %.
The effects of the anchoring heuristics can also be identified in financial decisions (see
Wärneryd, [2001], pp. 130).  In this context, it is interesting that Jacowitz and Kahneman,
[1995] find that the degree of anchoring effects depend on the degree of uncertainty about the
decision process.  For example, they demonstrate that the more judges were uncertain about
their judgements, the more the numeric estimates were assimilated to the provided anchor (see
Jacowitz and Kahneman, [1995] and  Mussweiler and Strack, [2000]).  Already  Keynes,
[1936] illustrates a mechanism of human expectations formation in a financial context that is
very similar to the above-mentioned anchoring heuristics:8
“It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are
very uncertain.  It is reasonable, therefore, to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts
about which we feel somewhat confident, even though they may be less decisively relevant to
the issue than other facts about which our knowledge is vague and scanty.  For this reason the
facts of existing situation enter, in a sense disproportionately, into the formation of our long-
term expectations; our usual practise being to take the existing situation and to project it into
the future, modified only to the extent that we have more or less definite reasons for expecting
a change.” (Keynes, [1936], p. 148).
5  Experimental Evidence
The dismal performance of professional forecasts can be attributed to common human
decision behaviour under uncertainty; namely the anchoring heuristics.  Thus, we now analyse
the forecasting behaviour of decision makers in an experimental setting to evaluate whether
TOTA is a common phenomenon of forecasting.  The advantage of using experiments is to
establish a comparable decision situation for the participants of the experiment.
5.1  Experimental economics and expectation formation
The experimental analysis of the formation of expectations goes back to the early 1960’s.
The first experiments by economists were independently conducted by  Fisher, [1962] and
Becker, [1967].  Later studies by Schmalensee, [1976], Garner, [1982], Bolle, [1988], Hey,
[1994] and  Becker and Leopold-Wildburger, [1996] focused on developing and testing
expectation models.  Generally, the results indicate a poor ability of economic models to
explain the subjects’ individual behaviour and inconsistencies with rational expectations in
the sense of Muth [1961].
However,  Becker and Leopold-Wildburger, [1996] developed a very simple model for
explaining collective forecasting behaviour, called the bounds & likelihood heuristics.  In the
past years experiments in different settings with more than 550 subjects were conducted.  The
results prove that the model performs well and a simulation study verifies that the findings are
not limited to the applied time series.
Nevertheless, the general applicability of this heuristics is limited to few experimental
settings, because time series of similar characteristics were used.  Therefore our interest is to
apply an exchange rate time series to an experiment with subjects.  We are concerned with the
following two questions:
§  Are there any similarities between the empirically observed forecasting behaviour of
experts and the forecasts of students in a laboratory environment?
§  Can the bounds & likelihood heuristics model the average opinion of subjects in this new
experimental setting?
5.2  The experiment
Within the experiment, subjects were confronted with forecasting a time series ( xt)
judgementally, i.e. predicting the value of the next period by eyeballing the past observations
without any help of statistical or econometrical models.  The forecasting horizon included 429
periods.  The initial value was given to the subjects at the time of their first prediction, thus
each subject made 41 forecasts.  The time series xt is a realisation of an autoregressive process
of second order,
01122 tttt xxx aaae -- =+++ ,
with the coefficients a0 = 0.09, a1 = 1.19, a2 = -0.28 and the error term et being uniformly
distributed in the interval [-5;5].  The coefficients were estimated from the US-$/€ exchange
rate.  All values have two decimal places.  The subjects were given no contextual information
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Time series xt
Average opinion
The experiment was conducted in the summer semester 2003 at the Department of
Economics, University of  Wuerzburg.  Altogether 46 undergraduate students participated
voluntarily.  They were recruited from a lecture in economics.  Overall, the number of
students is comparable to the sample size of the Reuters survey.
To ensure a high level of motivation, subjects were paid according to their forecasting
performance.  Thereby the payments  ˆ 3 ttt pxS =-- correspond to a linear function of the
prediction errors based on absolute deviations that are cut off to zero at a value of 3.  The
experiment was conducted with computers.  The subjects were asked four sample questions to
ensure they had completely understood the payment scheme.  The subjects set their pace
individually according to personal preferences.  The average payment was 3,3 € for an
average duration of about 20 minutes.
5.3  Experimental results
5.3.1   Rationality of judgmental forecasts
We test the unbiasedness hypothesis of the group opinion, defined as the simple average of n
individual forecasts,10
1







== ￿ , (4)
by estimating equation (2).  The results of the regression and the Wald-Test are presented in
Table 3.  The a coefficient is close to zero, but the b coefficient departs significantly from
one.  However, the Wald-Test suggests that the joint null hypothesis of a = 0 and b = 1 can
not be rejected.  Thus, subjects’ average forecasts are consistent with the concept of rational
expectations in the sense of Muth [1961], which is in line with results of other studies (see
e.g. Becker and Leopold [2000], Leitner [2003]).
Table 3: Rationality of judgmental forecasts
a a b b F-statistic






Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets.
5.3.2  Accuracy of judgmental forecasts
In order to evaluate the accuracy of average judgmental forecasts, we apply the measurement
categories used above.  The results – summarised in  Table 4 – show that professional and
judgmental forecasts perform somewhat differently.  In contrast to the forecast errors of
professional analysts, the negative mean error implies that the judgmental forecasts
underestimate the time series systematically.  A comparison of the forecasting performance of
judgmental forecasts and naïve forecasts suggests that the subjects in the experiment may
slightly beat the random walk forecasts as the corresponding value of Theil’s U is somewhat
below one.  However, a comparison of average judgmental forecasts with naïve forecasts by
the means of ME and MAE indicates that random walk forecasts are superior.  The hit rate of
subjects’ average opinion exceeds 50% and is thus larger than the professionals’ hit rate.
However, this result is not statistically significant.  Overall, subjects’ forecasting performance
seems to be comparable to that of a naïve random walk, but subjects show a better forecasting
performance than professional analysts.
Table 4: Accuracy of judgmental forecasts








Comparative values of random walk forecasts in parenthesis;
Test statistic of the c
2 – Test in brackets
Despite the distinctive forecasting performance of judgmental and professional forecasts, both
forecasts reveal a common characteristic.  The TOTA-coefficient for subjects’ forecasts
indicates a stronger relationship of forecasts with past observations than with future values of
the time series; the corresponding value for the average opinion of the subjects equals 0.7754.
Due to these surprising findings we analyse the experimental sample of Becker and Leopold-11
Wildburger [1996] and  Leitner [2003] of 267 and 32 subjects respectively.  In these
experiments the students had to forecast a univariate time series judgementally without any
additional information, which makes their experimental setting comparable to ours.  The
analysis supports our results: the Theils’ U of the average opinions are 0.7592 and 0.9842
respectively, the TOTA-coefficients are far below 1 at 0.7229 and 0.4587.  Thus, the
experimental results prove that the topically oriented trend adjustment behaviour is a general
characteristic of human forecasting behaviour in situations under uncertainty (see Figure 4).
Furthermore, it indicates that subjects may on average outperform the random walk forecasts.
These findings directly raise a question on the forecasting performance of professional
analysts.
Why do professionals especially trained in economic exchange rate analysing perform worse
than completely ignorant subjects?
Thomson et al. [2003] report similar findings in their recent experimental study on comparing
probability forecasts of experts and students for simulated exchange rates.  The students
achieved higher scores of accuracy than the experts.  The authors explain the results by the
expert’s believe in a fundamental value of the exchange rate, that causes an unwillingness to
accept strong trends (see also  Van  Hoek [1992]).  Therefore, our suggestion is that
professional analysts are misguided by the idea of an allegedly fundamental justified value of
the US-$/€ exchange rate which was generally expected to be around 1.15 (see  Table 5).
However, the speculative environment in foreign exchange markets seems to cause that
fundamental considerations are more or less unimportant – at least in the short and medium-
run.  Market participants also share this view.  Cheung and Wong [2000] and Cheung and
Chinn [2001] report that dealers believe that the poor performance of fundamental exchange
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Table 5: Selected estimates of the US-$/€ equilibrium exchange rate
Reference period Equilibrium exchange
rate(US-$/€)12
Wren-Lewis and Driver
(1998) 2000 1.19 – 1.45
Borowski and Couharde
(2000)
1999 (first half) 1.23 – 1.31
Clostermann and Schnatz
(2000) Winter 1999/2000 Short-run: 1.20
Medium-run: 1.13
Chinn and Alquist (2001) June 2000 Medium-run: 1.17 – 1.24
Lorenzen and Thygesen
(2000) 1999 Long-run: 1.28
Goldman Sachs (2000) May 2000 1.21
Source: Schneider [2003], European Central Bank [2002]
5.4  Modelling forecasting behaviour
5.4.1  The bounds & likelihood heuristics
In a last step, we now investigate whether the bounds & likelihood heuristics of  Becker and
Leopold-Wildburger [1996] can serve as a reasonable model for explaining the behaviour of
both professional analysts and subjects.  The b&l heuristics is a procedure that models the
group opinion of subjects.  The model assumes that two characteristics of a time series are
essential for the forecasts: the average variation and the turning points.  The average absolute














These average variations are the bounds for the predicted change based on the actual time
series value xt.  The maximum predicted change varies between the interval [-bt,bt].  The
predicted change depends on the likelihood that xt is a turning point.  In an upswing case (xt >
xt-1) lt(peak) is the probability, that xt is a local maximum.  If in period t all local maxima are
above xt, the probability that xt is turning point is low.  If all local maxima are below xt, i.e. xt
is the highest time series value, it is very likely to be a turning point.  For a downswing case
(xt < xt-1) the local minima are considered and lt(trough) is calculated.  In case of no change (xt =
xt-1) it is assumed, that the upswing and downswing have the same probability.  So the linear
combination of both cases is calculated.  At a high level of the time series, subjects will
forecast a downswing, for a low level an upswing.
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Based on these assumptions the bounds & likelihood heuristics is calculated as follows:13
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In the first periods, before local  extrema arise, the heuristics predicts a naïve forecast.
Therefore periods 1 to 8 are excluded from the analysis of the professional forecasts and
periods 1 to 6 for the analysis of the judgmental forecasts.
5.4.2  The performance of the bounds & likelihood heuristics
The bounds & likelihood heuristics describes the average forecasts of subjects very well.  As
presented in Table 6, the performance of the heuristics is superior to the random walk.  The
Theil’s inequality coefficient equals 0.7975 and is far below the critical value of one.  The
forecasted direction is modelled correct in 72.2% of all cases, which is significant according
to the c
2-test.  However, these good results do not hold for the Reuters one-month forecast.
The heuristics performs slightly worse than the random walk.  It also fails to forecast the
turning points.
These results are very interesting, because they represent the first application of an (artificial)
exchange rate time series to the bounds & likelihood heuristics.  The heuristics can model
collective forecasts very well even for more complex time series than those used by Becker
and  Leopold-Wildburger [1996].  However, the application to empirically observed
professional forecasts failed. The heuristics cannot explain the behaviour of the experts. An
important reason for this result may be found in the various sources of information that
experts use when making their prediction.  The subjects are only given the past values of one
single time series and this information is considered by the b&l heuristics very well.  The
forecasts of experts are based on several sources of quantitative and qualitative information.
The believe in a fundamental value can be regarded as such an information, which does not
affect the subjects in our experimental setting.  Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the relationship
between the b&l heuristics and the average opinion of the subjects and the Reuters one-month
forecasts.
The analysis reveals another interesting fact: the b&l heuristics models the average opinion of
forecasters, but it also predicts the €/US-$ exchange rate somewhat better than the experts.
The Theil’s inequality coefficient equals 1.05 which means that the heuristics forecasts the
exchange rate worse then the random walk, but still better than professionals, who achieved a
corresponding value of 1.0952.  The hit rate at 47.62% is not significant, but slightly higher
than the hit rate of professional forecasts.  These results underline the poor forecasting
performance of professional forecasts.  Even the b&l heuristics, a simple rule of thumb,
outperforms the experts.14
Table 6: The performance of the bounds & likelihood heuristics
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6  Conclusion
This study has again demonstrated economists’ poor forecasting capability concerning
exchange rates.  Furthermore, a typical characteristic of capital market forecasts has been
revealed by the TOTA coefficient.  In our experimental analysis, we prove that topically
oriented trend adjustment behaviour is a general characteristic of human forecasting
behaviour in situations under uncertainty.  However, although experimental forecasts were
also affected by subjects’ TOTA behaviour, they match – on average – with the economic
concept of rational expectations.  Moreover, subjects give better forecasts than experts.  These
unexpected results may be explained by an unreasonable strong orientation of professional
analysts on an allegedly fundamental justified value which was supposed to be around 1.15
€/US-$.
Applying the b&l-heuristics to our experimental results, reveals that this simple rule of thumb
explains the average forecasts of subjects very well, but not the Reuters one-month forecasts.
However, the b&l heuristics results in slightly better forecasts than professional analysts.
The experimentally based comparison of professional and judgmental forecasting behaviour is
an interesting domain of future research.  Two approaches are considered: the first approach
concentrates on further analysis of empirically observed data.  In our study, only one-month
Reuters forecasts were explored, but there are also professional forecasts for horizons of three,
six and twelve months.  Therefore, it is an obvious consequence to widen the forecasting
horizon of the experiment, in order to observe whether our findings hold true in such
situations.  The second approach is focused on the advantage of research in a laboratory
environment.  In an experiment all available information can be varied systematically.  The
analysis of professional forecasting behaviour in experimental environment could give
valuable insights into the reasons for their inferior performance.  Even though there already
exists some relevant literature and basic explanations have been derived from several studies,
these reasons remain unclear to us.  Due to the relevance of professional forecasts and their
performance the analysis on a larger scale is necessary.  Experiments with differently trended,
labelled and generated times series may help to answer those questions.  We also think that
the application of additional quantitative and qualitative information is an interesting aspect,
that has not yet been considered in experimental studies.
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